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An interesting point in patent law which, we believe, has never
come up in this country, was recently decided by the House of Lords.
The case is that of Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Basle Chemical
Works, Bindschedler, 77 Law Times Rep. 573. Defendants, who
were large chemists in Basle, manufactured and sent goods which,
they admitted, infringed the appellants' patent, to a London firm,
through a firm of forwarding agents at Basle, who sent the goods
by mail to the London firm according to their directions. Plaintiffs
claimed an injunction against both the defendants and the London
firm; the latter immediately gave bonds not to infringe in the future
and Justice North granted an. injunction against the defendants. The
Court of Appeal by a vote of two to one, vacated the injunction and
the House of Lords has just unanimously affirmed their action.
The real ground of the decision was that the sale was consummated,
in Basle, the postoffice being the agent of the buyer, especially in this
case, as the particular carrier was named by the buyer. Therefore
the defendant committed no act in England. nor any act punishable
under the English laws. The fallacy of Justice North's reasoning is
that he considers that an illegal act is being done and as the defend-
ants are parties to it they may be punished; as he himself says, he
doesn't care a straw where the property in the goods was or whether
the injunction could be enforced. But Lord Herschell says. "Acts
which here would be infringements of the patent, are no infringement,
if they are done in a country which is not within the ambit of the
patent."
The whole arrangement between the defendants and the
London firm seems to have been a scheme to evade the English
patent laws. The defendants having no agents in England and per-
forming their part of the scheme entirely without the country, could
not, of course, be punished under English laws. The London firm
were the only infringers in England of the patent.
In the only analogous cases in this country the articles were pat-
ented both in the United States and in the foreign country. Boesck v.
Graff, 133 U. S. 697, is the leading case. Here it was held that where
an article is patented both in the United States and in a foreign
country, a dealer residing in the United States cannot import and sell
the articles here without the license or consent of the owner of the
United States patent, although they were purchased in the foreign
country from a person authorized to sell them there. Nor according
to Featherstone v. Ormonde Cyde Co., 53 Fed. i io, can the licensee of the
foreign patent export and sell in this country the articles without the
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consent of the owner of the United States patent. Apparently it
would be otherwise if the purchase was made from the owner of or
licensee under each patent; but if the article was thus sold in the for-
eign country with a prohibition against importation into the United
States, any such importation and sale in the United States would be an
infringement (Dickerson v. Alfatheson, 57 Fed. 524). It will be noticed
that the action in all these cases was against the vendee, not the
vendor. But we do not see how, on true principles of law, the vendor
could in the foreign country, whether the article was there patented
or not, be enjoined by our courts from selling them.
In determining the many questions which arose under the
newly-adopted constitution, one of the essential principles of civil
liberty, that no State shall pass a law impairing the obligation of con-
tracts, was laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in
the now celebrated Dartmouth College case. Although this proposi-
tion has been since then universally recognized, there has neverthe-
less been a tendency to gradually narrow the scope of the word "con-
tract," thus preventing many frauds, while still protecting all valid
agreements. The case of Douglass v. Coinmonweal/h of Kentucky, i8
Sup. Ct. Rep. 199, shows a laudable inclination of the court to so con-
strue this principle as best to guard the interests and morals of the
public.
The Mayor and Council of the City of Frankfort had, under
a power given by the State constitution, granted in 1875, permission
to conduct a lottery, upon an agreement to pay to the city a certain
sum of money, and in consideration of an annual license fee of $2,000,
and certain other taxes. This right had been acquired by the
plaintiff in error by contract with the widow of the lottery grantee,
and he had since then conducted the business. In 1891 a new consti-
tution was adopted in Kentucky, which expressly prohibited lotteries
and revoked all privileges or charters heretofore granted. The
highest courts of the State had previously in several cases asserted
that said contract was valid, and on the faith of these decisions
plaintiff in error claimed to have spent large sums of money in
increasing the scope of the business.
The Supreme Court of the United States refused to hold itself
bound, however, by decisions of a State Court upon a statute
alleged to be in violation of the Federal Constitution, and laid
down the proposition that no State has a right "to contract away
its power to establish such regulations as are reasonably neces-
sary from time to time to protect the public morals against the
evils of lotteries." The rule previously laid down in Stone v.
.Mississi Ai, IOX U. S. 814, was followed; but the court denied the
assertion that the principle there decided was modified by ew
Orleans v. Houston, I9 U. S. 265, in which the revocation attempted
was under an act of the legislature, while in the former the act was
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justified by power of the constitution itself. Therefore, a grant of
permission to operate a lottery is not a contract, such that it cannot
be impaired, but is simply a license, revocable at pleasure, and under
which no vested rights can accrue, no matter what has been done
under a belief that such revocation is imoossible.
Another case, that of Deudley v. James, 83 Fed. 345, has just been
reported. in which Judge Barr in Kentucky, though on somewhat
different grounds, adopts the view laid down by Judge Baker in
Indiana (see December number YALE LAW JOURNAL page 138), and
declares that office deputy marshals cannot enjoin a new marshal
from removing them under the Civil Service Rules. He maintains
that since the Act of May 28, 1896, as well as previously, the terms of
deputy marshals expire, unless otherwise specially provided by law,
with the term of the principal marshal, and that thereafter they are
not in the Civil Service of the United States, and hence the rule of
the President bringing office deputies within the classified civil
service has no application after the expiration of the term of the
principal marshal, and therefore the deputy has no standing in court
to bring a bill for an injunction, even if an injunction would lie.
